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INTRODUCTION
The initial legal estimate of the attacks conducted against the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11 ) is that they were a criminal act carried out by a transnational terrorist organization, Al Qaeda (AQ).
1 However, the national passion for responding aggressively to the terrorist attack led the US to approve the use of military force against AQ and the hosting government in Afghanistan. The United States Congress quickly passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 2 placing the US on a "war footing" and the Patriot Act, 3 which drastically broadened law enforcement investigatory authorities and reduced privacy rights of Americans. 4 The United Nations (UN), United States, and Europe
Union (EU) all took significant steps to facilitate the tracking, targeting, and detention of terrorists, terrorist supporters and their financial assets.
It is in this flexible legal environment that the operational commander and the joint force have become accustomed to conducting counterterrorism operations. The actions of the UN, EU and US established a legally liberal operating environment that facilitated and enabled the prosecution of what the Bush administration deemed the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In the time since 9/11, the legal environment has gradually moved toward a refocus on protecting civil liberties and human rights, and the operational commander faces an uncertain future when it comes to addressing terrorist threats effectively.
The shift to the operational legal environment has gained momentum and is moving towards the more conservative legal norms observed prior to the 9/11 attacks.
Counterterrorism techniques have come under increased legal scrutiny as violations of individual civil liberties and human rights. Current legal trends in the US and Europe are hampering the widespread use of terrorist watchlists, international intelligence sharing, extraterritorial detention and arrests, and the criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects.
Trends indicate increasing pressure to divulge methods and sources of intelligence information used to interdict terrorist threats and movement towards a legal environment that emphasizes greater protections for civil liberties and human rights. The increased protections are interfering with current counterterrorism tools and practices.
How these legal cases and rulings affect the operational commander's ability to sustain and employ current counterterrorism tools such as terrorist watchlists, international intelligence sharing, extraterritorial detention and arrests, and the criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects has yet to be fully determined. How will recent legal challenges and associated rulings resulting in increases in civil liberties/human rights protections impact operational practices, protection of currently classified processes and systems, and the ability to work with current and future multinational partners in the conduct of counterterrorism operations? The operational commander must understand and plan for the changing operational legal environment in the counterterrorism realm or risk the degradation of vital counterterrorism tools such as terrorist watchlists, international intelligence sharing, extraterritorial detention and arrests, and the criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects.
LEGAL TRENDS
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States' operational legal environment remained a consistent struggle between the protection of individual civil liberties and the security of the nation. There was arguably an appropriate balance, with the protection of individual rights often prevailing on the premise that the US is a nation of laws empowered by the very people's liberties it protects. Historically, the protection of individual rights has ebbed and flowed based on the perceived threat the US faces and the desire for national security measures. The events of 9/11 resulted in a predictable shift toward national security and less protection of individual civil liberties. The pendulum swing that enabled the AUMF has changed direction and is gaining momentum in its movement to protect civil liberties and human rights, eroding the latitude the operational commander has to conduct counterterrorism operations. The change in procedures used to secure air travel typifies the shift in the legal operating environment.
Prior to 9/11, the American public accepted the limited measures employed by airport security to facilitate safe travel. It would have been unacceptable to have to remove your shoes or your jacket when going through airport security and prior to boarding an aircraft.
After 9/11, however, with sweeping changes in security posture and the creation of the TSA, Americans were subjected to, and willingly accepted, much greater security measures at airports such as full body pat downs and scans. The nature of the perceived terrorist threat to the nation required these additional security measures. With the passage of time and the events of 9/11 over a decade past, the tolerance of these personal intrusions is beginning to wane as evidenced by the increased legal challenges to the systems emplaced to protect society following 9/11. These cases show a trend of successful legal challenges to the watchlists, which are increasing in frequency. These cases threaten the integrity of the watchlists that operational commanders and partner forces use. If operational commanders continue to rely on faulty or restricted lists, then potentially the whole counterterrorism targeting process is at risk.
Commanders are one legal judgment away from losing these lists entirely. The inability to rely on this data would be detrimental to the operational commander's counterterrorism efforts.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE SHARING
The change in the operational legal terrain has had a dramatic impact on the operational force and how it conducts information and intelligence sharing for Operational commanders must issue guidance that is in accordance with national and international data sharing agreements that will address the requirements to protect the civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy, while enabling adaptability to fulfill mission requirements.
This operational guidance will support the management and monitoring of intelligence operations from conception through execution to ensure the implementation of proper information accountability and compliance mechanisms across the entire organization. Union Situation Center and the EU Intelligence Analysis Center that monitor and assesses security and terrorist threats to the EU. The operational commander must ensure that counterterrorism operations meet the requirements to support the sharing of intelligence and potentially evidence with our international partners. 42 In the end, the operational commander has an obligation to protect freedoms, civil liberties and privacy rights guaranteed to all US persons while facilitating the compliance with international intelligence sharing agreements to support international counterterrorism efforts.
TERRORIST DETENTION
Perhaps the most troubling legal trend for the operational commander is the increased protections granted to terrorist suspects internationally that dramatically limit the options the commander has to detain and interdict extraterritorial terrorist threats. The current movement indicates that the protections afforded terrorist detainees under the employment of the AUMF in accordance with LOAC are not strong enough. The operational commander must give a decision regarding the pre-mission training for forces and the structure of interagency operational elements. 
TERRORIST PROSECUTION
Both domestic and international legal challenges have reduced the ability to prosecute terrorist suspects successfully in US federal courts. Operational commanders are in a difficult position when it comes to assisting in the prosecution of terrorist suspects. The difficulty comes from the inability of the operational commander to ensure that the prosecution of a terrorist suspect and eventual conviction can occur without risking the classified information that was used to form the case.
During the conduct of counterterror operations, Service Members are transiting from combat and stability activities to perform what are typically police-like functions of arrests, processing of "crime scenes," and evidence collection for potential terrorist prosecution.
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The AUMF leveraged the military's capabilities to conduct intelligence collection and analysis to support counterterror targeting in support of the nation's policy decisions. The shift to a military intelligence based process is less restrictive regarding evidence due to a focus on protecting the nation and the rights of US citizens are less likely to be affected.
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This operational legal environment enabled the operational commander to utilize multiple counterterrorism tools without having to disclose sources, methods, and policies. 47 Haight. The War on Terror, Intelligence, Convergence, and Privacy. 48 Parker, "Civil Liberties in the Struggle Against Terror," 147.
Unlike the US, Europe still has strong protections against national intelligence agencies sharing information with any domestic law or security enforcement agencies.
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There are strict limitations on what type or sources of information may be accepted from foreign governments and as evidence that could eventually end up supporting a criminal terrorist prosecution. 50 The impact for the operational commander is an increasingly restrictive intelligence sharing environment. Europe is a concentration point that terrorists use to export attacks against the US and EUCOM and the collective European nations may not be in a position to interdict. 51 The restrictive intelligence sharing environment also limits the operational commander's chances of gaining a successful terrorist conviction if that conviction has to rely on evidence or intelligence collected obtained in a manner solely in line with US policies.
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) govern evidence used in federal criminal terrorist prosecutions, and it covers both the classified and unclassified types of evidence.
With the majority of the best evidence coming from classified intelligence sources, the risk is the prevention of US federal courts using the evidence due to current US judicial procedures.
The operational commander is then at risk of not supporting the requirements necessary for a conviction. 52 Additionally, difficulties with ensuring the authentication of physical evidence, commonly referred to as a chain of custody, and witness availability present further concerns that can limit the commander's ability to support a successful terrorist prosecution. The trends are clear and the legal operational environment of the future looks challenging. Operational commanders have already seen changes in the way they can conduct counterterrorism operations. The operational commander must stress to their subordinate commands to conduct counterterrorism operations within the boundaries of the ever-developing operational legal environment. The joint force needs to focus on fighting the terrorists, rather than the rules. Therefore, the operational commander must understand and plan for the changing operational legal environment in the counterterrorism realm.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Operational commanders and the joint force must understand and plan for the changing operational legal environment that is rebounding to ensure more civil liberties and human rights protections in the conduct of counterterrorism operations. With regards to Europe, EUCOM must take into account UN, European, and US civil liberties and human rights pressures and concerns and look for ways to work within this ever changing operational legal environment. As EUCOM conducts more UN sanctioned and European partnered force counterterrorism activities, EUCOM needs to understand the shortfalls in the counterterrorism tools currently employed and work to strengthen them in order to facilitate US counterterrorism operations. The joint force must understand the consequences of conducting counterterrorism operations with multinational partners that have different views of civil liberties, privacy and human rights from the US. EUCOM can play a vital role by facilitating the communication between actors, creating a system that protect rights, ensures due process, provides for redress, and maintains usable counterterrorism tools.
The operational commander's staff must actively research and comprehend the impacts of international legal changes to counterterrorism tools such as terrorist watchlists, international intelligence sharing, extraterritorial detention and arrests, and the criminal prosecution of terrorist suspects in order to assist in planning successful counterterrorism operations. Each year the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies and EUCOM Staff Judge Advocate sponsor an International Legal Conference (ILC). 60 The ILC provides an optimal opportunity for European and US lawyers to collaborate on the issue of terrorist watchlists. 61 The ILC would facilitate formal and informal consultation on this complex policy and legal issues facing the EUCOM Commander's ability to conduct counterterrorism effectively.
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Special Operations Command Europe (SOCCENT) is the ideal element to tackle the issues of threats to counterterrorism tools. SOCEUR is the lead for EUCOM's counterterrorism mission and is responsible for monitoring, facilitating, coordinating, and synchronizing all counterterrorism efforts. 63 SOCEUR established the CT-Core Cell to monitor, facilitate, coordinate, and synchronize counterterrorism efforts across the theater.
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SOCEUR works closely with our European partners, the US intelligence community, and other US combatant commands to identify and counter threats to the US and focuses on intelligence, information-sharing and developing partner capabilities. 65 Access to diverse resources makes the CT-Core Cell a perfect forum to improve counterterrorism tools.
Operational commanders need to establish practices and procedures at every level to ensure the protection of privacy information and that those protections enable the rapid sharing of intelligence where possible. Operational commanders should continue to develop the SSE skills, training, and execution to support successful prosecution of terrorist suspects.
The integration of trained and authorized law enforcement personnel into the operational force ensures the protection of civil liberties when conducting counterterrorism operations.
Using trained law enforcement personnel will help preserve evidence for federal terrorist prosecutions and allow military forces to focus on intelligence collection.
